SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
Electricity Law introducing the liberalized market in Hungary came into force in 2003 in order to apply competition in the industry. This act creates new environment for regulation of supply quality and a need for new methods and procedures. Principles for quality regulation in Hungary are described in [1] presenting the development of the electric power industry regulation towards the market liberalization in Hungary and covers the methods and procedures for monitoring and supervising supply quality including the quality incentive/penalty system for distribution introduced from 2003 via link between quality performance standards and distribution fee. The aim of this paper is to present the first results of quality of supply regulation introduced in 2003.
REASONS OF SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
Before the introduction of liberalized market that is till 2002 the following two methods indicated that the setting of performance standards was justified:
a) Security of high and medium voltage network
The breakdown records of system of security of medium and high voltage network have the longest historical database in Hungary as it was introduced before privatisation of industry. This monitoring method included several indices e.g. the number of interruption occurred in the HV and MV network.
The yearly evaluation of the breakdown reports makes it possible to monitor security and reliability of HV and MV network. E.g. the outage rate of medium and high voltage network is shown on Table I . (the outage rate is defined as the ratio of non-supplied power to the available power for consumers). [1, 2, 3] that the importance of monitoring the supply quality becomes greater in the case of price cap regulation, as the price cap regulation can result in cutting costs in order to increase profits, and privatization of utilities may reduce the quality of service in monopolistic activities. Moreover, price regulation without quality regulation may give unintended and misleading incentives to quality level. Hungarian experiences seem to underline that this statement is in harmony with international experiences, that is the network operator tends to reduce the maintenance costs and to postpone the replacement of the old components of the network without standards.
The Office made some effective measurements in order to improve overall security of medium and high voltage network. The results in the following years 2001 and 2002 can be seen in Table 1 .
b) Continuity of supply
The Hungarian Energy Office focused on the main features of continuity of supply in accordance with the international tendencies [2, 3, 4] . These consumer oriented monitoring methods -with an engineering approach -gave the following results before the introduction of liberalised market (Table II. ) 
PROCEDURE OF SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AFTER THE INTRODUCTION THE COMPETITION IN 2003
The electricity Act that created a liberalized electricity market from 1.January, 2003 brought lots of changes from the quality regulation point of view. One of them is that the transmission and distribution networks and the regulated public supply businesses are separated from competitive activities because they constitute natural monopolies. The other is that the Office, the Regulator is empowered to set the expected level and minimum quality standards of quality of each individual licensee.
The procedure of determination of standards is based on the results gained from data of security of high and medium voltage network of the distribution companies presented in the previous years. The data in year 1994-2001 shows that (1) the performance is changing year by year reflecting more or less the changing weather; (2) the tendency of the performance in the same period is worsening. Taking into account these facts the expected levels and minimum quality standards are based on the average of year 1999-2001 in order to solve the problems of changing weather and to stop the worsening tendency. It is worth mentioning that the application of three-year average is not a unique tool of supply quality regulation [6] .
Taking account that the further worsening should be avoided, the Office launched projects with proposed standards of performance and made consultations with representatives of companies and consumer interest representing organizations. Besides the Office's homepage was used to publish the proposals. It makes the Regulator's work transparent. 
FIRST RESULTS IN THE FIELD OF NETWORK SECURITY
The aim of network security standards is to regulate the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances such as The first year experiences show an improvement in the field of network security.
FIRST RESULTS IN THE FIELD OF CONTINUITY OF SUPPLY
The aim is to guarantee a minimum quality threshold to average customers. The procedure of determination of standards is similar to one of the network security The results of the evaluation of performances of the supply quality after introduction the regulation show that the improvement of the actual performances of the distribution companies is significant. The nationwide CML in Hungary improved from 411 in 1999 to 155 minutes in 2003 (Fig.3) . 
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Fig.3 National Costumer Minutes Lost (CML) in Hungary
The performances of the distribution companies differ from each other significantly (Fig.4) . It must be noted that the standards took into account the very bad performance of 1999. The CML standards are the single standards, which are rolling year by year in order to improve the performance. The annual improvement depends on the performance of the interruption duration time: where the performances of the previous three years were low, the improvement targets are higher (Table III.)   TABLE III .
Continuity of supply improvement target
CML (SAIDI) min/ year
61-180
181-240
241-300
301-360
The results are that the standards of the following year depend only on performances of the previous three years. Therefore we can expect that the fulfilment in the following year will be around 1 instead of 0,52…0,83.
FIRST RESULTS IN THE FIELD OF QUALITY INCENTIVE/PENALTY REGIME
Minister of Economy introduced then quality incentive
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Session No 6 regulation from 1 January 2003. According to the ministerial decree the Office is entitled to select maximum 4 supply quality performance indices from the previously described minimum standards and the distribution network charge and the company profit depends on the performance of the minimum standards.
The Office designated 3 quality performance standards to be taken into account in the quality incentive regime for the next 3 years (Table IV) . The incentive/penalty mechanisms are as follows.
The regulated distribution charge should be decreased a) by 0,5% if the performance is worse than 5 % but less then 10%, and b) by 1% if the performance is worse than 10% or more than the standard. In case 2 or 3 minimum standards are worse, then the decrease of distribution charge should be determined by adding them. In the worst case it means a total 3% decrease in charge. The amount of decrease should be transferred to the consumer in a way agreed with the Office. In case any of the performance is better by 10% and none is worse, the profit limit may be 10 % higher. The procedure is that each network operator prepares and submits annual report to the Office by March 31. The report should contain, among others, a self-evaluation of the quality performance and show the necessary decrease of distribution charge or the possible profit increase. The Office makes the final decision in a form of a formal approval. It will come into force from July 1 of every year for one year. The first year evaluation of performance shows that the distribution companies fulfilled the supply quality requirements. The Table IV shows the performances and the fulfilments of the Interruption frequency (SAIFI or CI) as an example by each distribution company. The result means that all the distribution companies improved the unplanned interuption frequency in the first year of regulation and they do not need to decrease the network charges.
CONSUMER RELATIONS
The Office issued -after consultation -regulation on the following indices in the field of consumer relations: The evaluation showed that further experiences needed in these fields. The reason is that in this field more historical and robust data are needed for drawing reliable conclusions. The main results are that since the beginning the regulation the reliable data collection has begun and this will give the possibility to prepare a correct evaluation.
